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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TUCKER RE.ALTY, INC., 
Plaintiff and Respondent~ 
vs. 
L. DOYLE NUNLEY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
No. 
10066 
ST.A.TEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for a sum of money claimed to be 
due and owing to the plaintiff on a promissory note for 
a real estate commission, which amount the defendant 
claims was paid in full by the painting of the plaintiff's 
duplex by the defendant, as a painting contractor. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VER COURT 
A default judgment was entered against the de-
fendant for failure to comply with the pre-trial order 
and the defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and an 
order remanding the case for trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The pre-trial order provides among other things 
that: 
"The defendant is directed within 10 days 
from the date hereof, to furnish all the items that 
he has available, contained in the motion of the 
plaintiff filed herein on the 9th day of January, 
1963. 
"In the event that the defendant has said docu-
ments and fails to supply the same within the 
10-day period, judgment will be granted in favor 
of the plaintiff and against the defendant, to-
gether with additional attorney fees." 
The motion of January 9th, 1963 referred to was 
supported by an order of Court dated March 5th, 1963. 
(R. 25). This order was fully complied with. On the 
12th day of March, the defendant appeared before the 
plaintiff's attorney and explained that he was unable 
to find any of the things demanded. ( R. 27) . Excep-
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ticm. however, was taken by the plaintiff and on the 
tHth day of ~larch, 1963, the motion of the plaintiff 
sc:cking conte1npt proceedings against the defendant 
was heard. (R. 28-20). The motion was denied on the 
18th day of June, 1963. (R. 30). 
On the 19th day of June, 1963, a notice of readi-
ness for trial was served and filed by the plaintiff certi-
fying among other things: 
"3. That such use of the rules of discovery as 
counsel feels necessary for the trial of this cause 
has been completed, and that the case is at issue." 
After the entry of the pre-trial order of November 
19th, 1963, the defendant made another search for the 
records called for in the plaintiff's motion of January 
9th. 1963, (T. 8) and found one only invoice forma-
terials used on the plaintiff's duplex, which the defend-
ant. within the time allowed, delivered to the plaintiff. 
(T. 3). This in turn, however, was not satisfactory to 
the plaintiff and motion for a default judgment was 
fully heard on the 19th day of December, 1963, wherein 
it was disclosed (T. 6) that the defendant had in com-
pliance with the pre-trial order furnished to the plain-
tiff all of the items that were available to him. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY 
SHO,VS .A. FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
PRE-TRIAL ORDER. 
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From the evidence before the Court at the time of 
the hearing of the plaintiff's motion for a default, it is 
conclusively shown that the defendant made a search of 
his records and that he gave to the plaintiff all of the 
records that were available to him. (T. 3-5): 
Q. And did you make a search to find those 
records? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what was the result of that search? 
A. I found one record. 
Q. What record was that? 
A. This was a paint bill from Salt Lake Glass 
& Paint Company. 
Q. Do you know in substance approximately 
what was the amount of the balance shown on 
that particular invoice was? 
A. It was around $35.00. I am not sure of the 
amount exactly. 
Q. Now what became of that invoice? 
A. I received it from Salt Lake Glass, and I 
took it to your office, and you asked me to deliver 
it to Mr. Ryberg's office, which I did. He wasn't 
there at the time and I left it with his secretary, 
telling her this was the information or the rec-
ords I have on that job. 
Q. Did you leave it with his secretary? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was that within the time provided by the 
Pretrial Order in this case? 
A. Yes. 
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(~. :\ow in fad. ~lr. Nunley, does that invoice 
contain all of the inforination that you have on 
your records 'vith reference to the material that 
~vas furnished on that job'? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And do you know where the other-what 
was the source of other materials used on that 
job, if there were other materials used? 
A. It was taken from our stock, the stock that 
we haYe to work jobs with, which we buy in ad-
vance, a number of gallons, sometimes six months 
in advance of this and use them up. 
Q. Are you a general painting contractor? 
A. Yes .... 
Q. Now, do you know who did the labor on 
that job? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who? 
A. ~Iyself and my son, James D., and my 
brother, James Arthur Nunley. 
Q. And you were unable to find any records 
of that labor on your record? 
.A. That is right. 
POINT II. 
THERE IS XO EY.IDENCE IN THE REC-
ORD TH.A T THE DEFENDANT HAD ANY 
OF TI-IE RECORDS SOUGHT, AT THE TilVIE 
OF THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER. 
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The entire case of the plaintiff is built on the 
answers of the defendant in his deposition taken on 
the 27th day of November, 1962. On page 8 of his 
deposition he is asked: 
Q. Do you have copies of the invoices for paint 
that went into this particular job. 
A. I could get thein. 
Q. Do you have them? 
A. I don't have them with me. 
Q. Do you have them in your constructive pos-
session-in your records and files ? 
A. Maybe; I am not sure of it. I may have 
some of them. I am not sure I would have all 
of them. 
On page 9, with reference to the matter of labor, 
he is asked: 
Q. 'Vhat kind of records are these you keep? 
A. Just in the life of the job on it, we keep 
it. When that is through we destroy it; destroy 
that. We have no need for these after that. We 
know amount on what costs were; enter costs and 
that is it. 
Q. What do you mean "enter cost"; into 
what? 
A. In our book, what job cost us. We go over 
our materials. This we know; what we have left 
is profit. 
Q. Did you keep such a record on this par-
ticular job? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And you han: the record-
,\. Yes. 
(~. -still available 1 
A. Yes. 
On the I ~th day of March, I963, he is called upon 
to produce these records and he is unable to find them. 
On the 19th day of November, I963, he is ordered by 
threat of default to make available to the plaintiff any 
of the records tlm t he has and he does so. 
POINT III. 
THERE .ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MA-
TERIAL F.c\CT \VHICH TO OBTAIN SUB-
S'L\NTIAL JUSTICE BETWEEN THE PAR-
TIES SHOlTLD BE HEARD. 
From an examination of pages IO and II of the 
defendant's deposition it appears that a certain job 
would be done for the full payment and satisfaction 
of the note sued upon. 
Considering the facts most favorable to the de-
fendant as we must do in cases of this kind; Frederick 
~lay & Co., Inc. Y. Dunn, I3 U2 40, 368 P2 266; we 
have a situation where the amount and cost of materials 
and the amount of labor is immaterial. The plaintiff 
says you do this job and I will cancel the note. The 
defendant in consideration that he will have his note 
fully paid does the job, and then the plaintiff, having 
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received the benefits, disregards its agreement and 
brings an action for the full amount of the note. 
Q. Did you ever, at any time, on or about 
May 20, make any estimate of the cost to the 
Tucker Real Estate-what this job would be? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Did you tell him, at that time, that you 
would only do it if .it was in full satisfaction. of 
the note? -
A. This was my understanding that I was. 
(R. 10) . 
POINT IV 
IT WOULD BE INCONSISTENT TO PER-
MIT THE PLAINTIFF TO DEFAULT THE 
DEFENDANT AFTER THE PLAINTIFF 
HAD CERTIFIED THAT ITS NEEDS FOR 
THE RULES OF DISCOVERY HAD BEEN 
COMPLETED. 
On the 12th day of March, 1963, the plaintiff was 
advised by the defendant that the defendant had none 
of the documents or records requested by the plaintiff. 
(R. 27). More than three months later, the plaintiff 
certified in its notice of readiness that "use of the rules 
of discovery ... had been completed." 
CONCLUSION 
The record shows that the plaintiff, which held the 
defendant's note for $1,020.00, induced the defendant 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to paint the plaint iff's duplex inside and out with three 
coats of' paint, including a double garage, with the un-
derstanding that by so doing the defendant would pro-
cure a full satisfaction of the note. Defendant's depo-
sition was taken by the plaintiff and inquiry was made 
in great detail into such matters as the cost of the paint, 
and the amount and cost of the labor. Demand was 
subsequently made for copies of the defendant's time 
cards,\\'-~ Income Tax forms, withholding tax returns, 
job books, etc., and though it has been felt by the 
defendant and is respectfully submitted to the above 
entitled Court, that this inquiry was into immaterial 
matters, the real issue being was there a contract for 
the painting of a duplex for the satisfaction of a note, 
the defendant has conscientiously tried to provide the 
information and has fully complied with the provisions 
of the Court's pre-trail order. It is felt by the defendant 
that the default judgment of December 27th, 1963, 
here appealed from was entered by the Court by mis-
take. Certain it is that to obtain substantial justice 
between the parties the judgment should be set aside 
and the case remanded for trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Horace J. Knowlton 
Attorney for Defendant 
214 Tenth Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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